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THE PHILOSOPHY OP WILLIAM JAMES. 
To attempt to portray the philosophy of a man like the 
late William James of Harvard in a paper of this length is 
merely to trace a few of his main lines of thought hut it may 
serve to gather together from the many sources some of the most 
closely related ideas and to show to some extent his preeminent 
position among the great thinkers of the world. 
Profess^!* James believed that each person has a philosophy 
which determines the perspective in his world. He said "This 
philosophy is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly 
and deeply means. It is our individual way of just seeing and 
feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos." 2. Man's 
temperament determines his philosophy, though he does not give 
this as a reason for his conclusions, because this would not 
appear as competent authority. Many of us "hardly know our own 
preferences in abstaact matters and so follow the most impressive 
philosopher." 
In this day of fanaticism and agnosticism, Professor James 
saw the dangers in the path of the man unable to show the reasons 
for his beliefs. He saw that 3 "there is really no scientific 
or other method by which man can steer safely between the 
opposite dangers of believing too little or of believing too 
1. Bibliography IV, p 4. 2. Bib. IV, pp. 7-8. 
3. Preface to I. p. 11, 
much.1* 4. "The trueist scientific hypothesis is that which 
works "best and it cannot be otherwise with religious hypotheses." 
Religious history has proven that one hypothesis after another 
has worked ill "hut some articles of fate have maintained 
themselves through every vicissitude and possess more vitality 
today than ever "before." 
5. "There is but one indefectibly certain truth, even 
scepticism has left thisstanding, that is, that the present 
phenomena of consciousness exists." 6. "No concrete test of 
what is true has even been agreed upon." There is nothing 
which someone has not thought absolutely true and absolutely 
false. The empiricist does not give up the quest of truth 
itself, although he cannot tell when he has gained it. By 
anything being true, he means that the total drift of thinking 
tends to confirm it. 7. "To get knowledge we must obey two 
distinct laws, we must know the truth and we must avoid error." 
7. Clifford tells us it is better never to believe anything than 
to incur error, but James says. 8. "Our errors are not such 
solemn things that they need to take away our lightness of heart. 
We incur them in spite of all caution." 
9. "When we stick to it that there is truth, moral or other-
4. Preface to I, p.12. 5. I, p. 14. 
6. I, p. 15. 7. I, p/ 17. 
8. I, p. 19. 9. I, p. 23. 
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10, I, p. 25. 
12. I, p. 26. 11. I, p. 25 13. I, p. 26 
wise, we do so with our whole nature, "but the sceptic adopts 
the doubting attitude with his whole nature. We cannot tell 
which o£ us is the wiser. 10. "The desire for certain kinds 
of truth brings about the existence of that truth." 10. "A 
mans faith acts on the powers above him as a claim and creates 
his own verification." A desired result is achieved because in 
the co-operative scheme, individuals have faith in each other. 
10*. "Where faith in a fact can help create the fact, it would be 
an insane logic which would say that faith running ahead of 
scientific evidence, is the lowest kind of immortality." Faith, 
based on desire then, is lawful and, possibly indespensible. 
James saw no reason why a man should be a sceptic, but he 
did find strong reasons why he must accept some things. 11. "Sc-
ience says things are, morality says some things are better than 
others, religion says the best things are the more eternal 
things, " and 12. "that we are better off even now, if we believe 
her first affirmation to be true." We are supposed to gain, 
even now, by our belief and to lose by our nonbelief, a certain 
vital good. 13. If we remain sceptical "we avoid the error if 
religion be untrue but we lose the good if it be true." 
Scepticism is not then avoidance of error but it says, "13, Better 
risk the loss of truth, tha chance of error." It is intellect 
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against one passion. 14. "Duperi through hope is no worse 
than Duperi through fear." 15. "We have the right to believe, 
at our own risk, any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt 
our will." "If we are empiricists, if we are not sure when 
truth is in our grasp, then it seems absurd to wait to know a 
truth before we ask." For belief is measured by action. We 
act in either case before we have full evidence. As Pitz James 
Steven says, "we can get nowhere by standing still, we must 
act for the best, hope for the best, and taken what comes." 
Some people are not willing to do this. They know that 
they must encounter some evil and the uncertainty of what life 
is to bring to them causes them to becomepessimistic and they 
prefer to destroy their lives. James ThAmpson in his poem "The 
City of Dreadful Hight," has said that life is not worth 
living and you are free to end it when you will. James desires 
to show to the would-be suicide that life is worth living. 17. 
He says reflection would not stop it, if it came from a sudden, 
frenzied impulse. 18. "Too much questioning and too little 
active responsibility lead, almost as often as to much sensualism 
does, to the edge of the slope, at the bottom of which lie 
pessimism and the nightmare or suicidal view of life, "but 
further reflection can overcome this. 18. "Pessimism consists 
14. I, p. 27. 15. I, p. 29. 16. I, p. 30. 
17. II, p. 38. 18. II, p. 39. 
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in a religious demand to which there comes no normal religious 
reply." 
19, What brings melancholy is our belief in a spirit 
which owns and encompasses us and with which we ought to have 
some communion, and then our knowledge of the character of feiieh 
apspirit as revealed by the course of things in the world. Ho 
brute or irreligious man can have this melancholy. 20. "nature 
on her visible surface revells no such spirit but something in 
each one of us owns allegiance to such a spirit. 21. "If there 
be a divine spirit of the universe, nature, such as we know her? 
cannot possibly its ultimate work to man." "We, with our evolu-
tionary theories and our mechanical philosophies, already know 
nature too impartially and too well to worship unreservedly 
any God of whose character she can be an adequate expression." 
21. All we know of good and beauty proceeds from nature, and 
also all we know of evil. 21. It is a gain that the worship of 
the God of Uature, simply taken as such, has begun to loosen 
its hold upon the educated mind and the universe is beginning 
to rebel against the thought that any such God exists. 23. To 
make an idol of the spirit of nature and worship it causes souls 
that are religious and that would be scientific to become mel-
ancholy. The first step in the escape is to deny the idol. 
19. II, p. 42. 20. II, p. 43. 21. II, p. 44. 
22. II, p. 43. 23. II, p. 46. 
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23. "There are in most men instinctive springs of vitality 
that respond healthily when the "burden of metaphysical and 
infinite responsibility rose off," "The thought that suicide 
is no longer a guilty challenge gives comfort. Curiosity as 
to what the next day will bring also helps. Then there is the 
thought that one can help to overcome evils. Sufferings do not 
lessen the love of life but make it keener. Struggle inspires 
us, triumph brings the void. Life is worth living, no matter 
what it brings, if one may combat and help to triumph over evil. 
This is a resignation based on manliness and pride." 24. "We 
are bound to take some suffering and some self-denial upon our-
selves in return for all those lives upon which ours are built. 
25."To him who has cast away all metaphysics and will own nothing 
to religion, mere instinctive curiosity, pugnacity, and honor 
may make life worth living." 
"Religion is here used in its supernatural sense, 25. "the 
order of nature which constitutes this world's experience, is 
only one portion of the total universe and that there stretches 
beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we now know 
nothing positive but in its relation to which our present mundane 
life consists." 25. "A mans religious faith means his faith 
in an unseen order of some kind, in which the riddles of the 
24. II, p. 50. 25. II, p. 51/ 
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natural order my be found explained." 25. "We have a right 
to believe the physical order to be only a partial order. ' We 
have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which 
we assume on trust if we may thereby make life more worth 
living." 26. "Our science is only a drop of knowledge, our 
ignorance a sea." To wait for evidence is to what the unknown 
world of science containes, or even the spiritual world 
before we believe anything would not do, because action is a 
part of belief and action often becomes necessary. 27. If 
&eeds of ours outrun the visible universe, why may not that be a 
sign that an invisible universe is there." 27. "Beliefs were 
given us only to ltve by and not to trust our religious beliefs 
means to ltve by them and act as if the invisible world were 
real. "Destroy this inner assurance and all the light and 
radiance and existence for many people is extinguished." The 
most adverse life would seem worth living if we knew the life 
was to bear fruit in an unseen world. 29, Vivisection can mean 
nothing good to the dog but we see the good of it. We see his 
world and ours. Another world may encompass ours as our world 
does his world and to believe in this world may be the most 
essential function which our lives have to perform. This is 
only a hypothesis but all science is based upon hypotheses. 
26. II, p. 54. 27. II, p. 56. 28. II, p. 56. 
29. II, p. 58. 
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Believing in the line of one's needs helps the need to be 
fulfilled. 30. "Have faith that you can make a leap and your 
feet are nerved to do it. Refuse to believe and, if standing 
upon the edge of a precipice, you must perish." 31. Mistrust 
of life removes the part that is worth living. This life is 
what we make it, from the moral point of view. 31. "God him-
self may draw vital strength and increase of being from our vital-
ity." Professor James says, 31. "I do not know what the sweat 
and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything 
short of this. It means nothing if it is not a real fight but 
it appears to us to be a real fight. It seems as if there were 
something really wild in the universe which we were needed to 
redeem." 
Professor James believed the work of the philosppher to be 
to make things seem more rational. He said, "when anything appears 
rational, there is a strong feeling of ease, peace and rest. The 
thought seems rational when we are able to think with perfect 
fluency." Mystical minds seek the peace of rationality through 
ecstacy when logic fails. 32. If two conceptions equally fit 
the logical demand, the one will be accounted more rational 
which awakens the active impulses or satisfies other aesthetic 
demands." "Empiricists have believed that the feeling of 
30. II, p. 59. 31. I, p. 61, 32. Ill, pp. 76-77. 
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familiarity and rationality are one and the same and that no 
other kind of rationality exists." So long as an object is 
unusual, our expectations are baffled but as soon as it becomes 
familiar, aur expectations are fully determined. A philosophic 
conception must be such as to banish uncertainty from the future. 
33. "Novelty ought to irritate in order that one may protect 
himself from danger." However much a philosophy may give a 
conception of clearness and consistency, it will never triumph 
if it refuses to legitimate in an emphatic manner the more 
powerful of our emotional and practical tendencies. Materialism 
fails for this reason. It says the real meaning of the impulses 
is something which has no emotional interest for us. We feel 
that there is an outward cause for our emotions while materialism 
objects. Each one desires to feel that his action at sometime 
is necessary for the success of the whole. 
Philosophers have tried to keep the element of faith out of 
sight. 34. "Faith is the readiness to act in a cause, the 
prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance. It 
is the same moral quality which we call courafee in practical affair. 
Scientific philosophers insist that an ingredient of faith is 
necessary in our mental make up but they say it is only legiti-
mate in one proposition, that is, that nature is uniform. We 
33. Ill, p. 79. 34. Ill, p. 90. 
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must assume that nature will follow the sme laws today that she 
did yesterday. Many philosophers hold that it is a shame to 
have faith in other things, that is merely a r eligious dogma. 
35. Professor James has said, "We know that the whole individual 
is at work when we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, 
will, passion, and taste co-operate." "The only escape from 
faith is mental nullity." "IP our inborn faculties are good 
and we yield to our belief, we become prophets, if they are 
poor, we are failures. We stake all and if our persons will help 
us to a conclusion, we should stake them there. Paith is 
synonymous with working hypothesis." We cannot live or work 
at all without some degree of faith. 
In regard to the good and evil in the world, evolution 
has said, "that is to be called good which is destined to pre-
vail or survive." Professor James objected to this because if 
men simply wanted to find out the good here, there would be no 
progress. He said, "This violates our general wish to lead and 
not to follow. Ho wise evolutionist doubts that the course of 
destiny may be altered by individuals. The best, according to 
evolution, is that which has the biggest endings. The evo-
lutionary standard measures action by the winning side.36"Again 
and again success depends upon energy of act; energy again depends 
35. Ill, pp. 94,95. 36. Ill, p. 100. 
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en faith that we shall not fail and that faith in turn on the 
faith that we are right - which faith thus verifies itself," As 
James Hinton says, "Existence "becomes worthless if we succeed 
in putting away all the little inconvenience, exertions and 
pains. The enjoyment in endurance is according to intensity of 
life, that pains are unendurable does not mean that they are too 
great but that we are ill. We have not our proper life, thus 
pain is not necessarily an evil but an essential element of the 
highest good." 
37. The materialist says 'that judgments of worth are them-
selves mere matters of fact, that the words good and bad have 
no sense apart from subjective passions and Interests which we 
may play fast and lose with as we will, so far as any duty of 
ours as to the non human universe is concerned. It is best for 
our social interests to keep a promise, &here is no right or 
wrong in it.1 
37. For the absolute moralist, the interests are not there 
meeely to be felt, they are to be believed and obeyed. "He who 
believes this to be a radically moral universe must hold the 
moral order to rest on either an ultimate and absolute should or 
on a series of shoulds all the way down." There is a vast dif-
ference between this objective moralist and the feubjective one. 
37. Ill, Pp. 103, 104. 
T 1 
The suhjectiveist in morals is always free to seek harmony "by 
toning down his feelings or lulling them to sleep in any way 
possible. "To the absolute moralist, "resistance, poverty, 
martyrdom or tragedy are the feasts of his inward faith, rather 
these than give up his ideals." 
39. Professor James has said in regard to faith, "verifi-
cation of our faith cannot occur in the life of one philosopher 
but the experience of the entire human race must make the veri-
fication and all the evidence will not be in until the last man 
has said his say." "The world may be likened to a lock whose 
inward nature, moral or unmoral, will never reveal itself to 
our simply expectant gaze. Instead of waiting until all the 
evidence is in, we may try the moral key and if it fits, it is 
a moral lock, if we try the immoral key and it fits, it is an 
immoral lock." It is our business to try the key which we 
prefer. "Doubt is in itself a decision, scepticism in moral 
matters is an active ally of immorality, and whatever we do not 
hinder, if it is in our power, we are helping." 
In regard to the existence of God, Professor James says, 
40, Some outward reality of a nature defined as God's nature 
must be defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the same 
time rational and possible for the human mindls contemplation." 
"If we allow that the human mind is the triadic structure of 
38. Ill, p. 105. 39. Ill, pp. 107-109 
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impression, reflection and reaction, then anything short of 
God is not rational and anything more than God is not possible." 
It is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in 
the universe and he must be conceived under the form of a mental 
personality. Extiinsically considered, God's peraonality is 
to be regarded like any other personality as something lying 
out&ide of my own and whose experience I simply come upon and 
find. "A power not ourselves then, which not only makes for 
righteousness but means it and which recognizes us. In whatever 
other respects the divine personality may differ from ours or 
may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in that 
both have purposes for which they care and each can hear the 
others call." Nothing will pass as rational which violates the 
activity of either of the three departments of the mind or leaves 
them without a chance to work. Theism, because of its practical 
rationality, will survive all lower creeds. Materialism and 
agnosticism could never gain popular acceptance, for they give 
a solution of things which is irrational to the practical third 
of our nature. Theism always stands ready with the most pratclaal 
rational solution it "is possible to conceive. It appeals to 
every energy of our active nature. 41. If science rules out all 
other appitites and becomes the ruling God, the nation will 
just as surely go to ruin and fall a prey to their more richly 
constituted neighbors as the beasts of the field, as .a whole, have 
fallen a prey to man, 40. V, pp. 116-122. 
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41. "The sense of emotional reconciliation with God which 
characterizes the highest moments of the theistic consciousness 
may he described as "oneness" with him and so from the very 
bottom of theism, a monistic doctrine seems to arise, but this 
consciousness of self-surrender, of absolute practical union 
between one's self and the devine object of one's contemplation, 
is a totally different thing from any sort of substantial identity. 
Still the object God and the subject I are two. His existence 
is given to me but I am something radically other than the 
Divinity with whose effulgence I am filled. How the mind and 
will v/hich are not God, can know him and leap to meet him, how 
it came to be separated from him and how God himself came to be 
at all are problems the theist cannot solve but it is sufficient 
for him to know that he himself simply is and needs God and that 
behind this universe God simply is and will be forever and will 
in some way hear his call." 
42. "It is more than probably that to the end of time our 
power of moral and volitional response to the nature of things 
will be the deepest organ of communication therewith we shall 
ever possess. In every being that is real, there is something 
that is external to and sacred from the grasp of every other. 
God's being is sacred from ours. To co-operate with his creation 
41. V, pp. 152-134. 43. V, Pp. 141-142. 
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by the best and Tightest response, seems all he wants of us. 
In such co-operation with his purposes, (not In any chimerical 
speculative conquest of him,) not in any theoretic drinking of 
him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny. The mere 
turning of our character, the dumb-willingness to suffer and to 
serve this willingness, is more than all theories about it 
put together." "The most any theory about is can do, is to 
bring us to that, A resolute moral will, no matter how 
inartjculate or unequipped with learning its owner may be, exto-
rts from us a respect we should never pay, were we not satisfied 
that the essential root of personality lay there." 
Hot only a mans philosophy but also his ethical position, 
Professor James attributes to temperament. He has said that the 
"deepest difference practically in the moral life of the man 
is the difference between the easy going and the strenuous mood. 
The ruling consideration in the easy going mood is shrinking from 
present ills while the strenuous mood makes us indifferent to 
present ill if only the greater ideal be obtained." "The capacity 
of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human 
possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or tra-
ditional grounds for believing in a God, men would postulate 
one simply as a pretext for living hard and getting out of the 
game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest." "Exactly 
42. V, pp. 141-142. 
-16-
what the thought of the infinite thinkers may he is hidden from 
us even were we sure of his existence, so that our postulation 
of him, after all, serves only to let loose in us the strenuous 
mood hut this is what it does in all men, even those who have 
no interest in philosophy." 
The determinists object to the idea of chance in the 
world. "If a particle of it exists," they say, "what is to 
prevent entire chaos." James says, 44. "Do not all the motives 
that assail us, all the futures that offer themselves to our 
choice, spring equally from the soil of the past, and would not 
either one of them, whether realized through chance or necessity, 
the moment it was realized, seem to us to fit that past and in 
the completest and most continuous manner to Interdlgitate 
with the phenomena already there." Indeterminism does mean 
chance, but $5. "the world must not be regarded as a machine whose 
final purpose is the making real of any outward good but rather 
as a contrivance for deepening the theoretic consciousness of what 
goodness and evil in their intrinsic natures are. Hot the doing 
either of good or evil is what natures cares for but the knowing 
of them. Life is one long eating of the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge." This is a br anch of subjectivism which regards every 
thing which happens in the universe as subsidiary to what we 
45. VIII, p. 165-169 
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think or feel about it." James saw the tragedy of life and 
could not get rid of evil in the world ad easily as Royce did 
by saying, -"the best in evil setting becomes the worse." James 
said, "It is not easy to escape pessimism when we try to make 
thfe principle of absolute perfection agree with the facts of 
life. If God be good, how came he to create - or if he did 
not create, how came he to permit the powers of evil ? Subject-
ivism tries to make the bad seem less bad. It says," There Is 
something rather absurd in our ordinary notion of external things 
being good or bad in themselves. They cannot be bad without 
any one to feel their badbess and paradise could not bee good 
unless the goodness was perceived." Outward goods and evils 
seem practically indistinguishable except in so far as they 
result in getting moral judgments made about them, then the 
moral judements seem the main thing, and the outward facts mere 
perishing instruments for bringing them about. "Regarded as a 
stable finality, every outward good becomes a mere weariness to 
the flesh." "It must be menaced, be occasionally lost, for its 
goodness to be fully felt as such. No one knows the worth of 
innocence until he knows it is gone forever and that money cannot 
buy it back. Hot the saint, but the sinner that repenteth is he 
to whom the full length and breadth and height and depth of 
life's meaning is revealed." "Not the absence of vice but vice 
there and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the ideal human 
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state, according to subjectivism and it sees no reason to 
suppose it not a permanent human state." The final purpose of 
our creation seems most plausably to be the greatest possible 
enrichment of our ethical consciousness through the most intense 
play of contrasts and the widest diversity of characters. 
46. To James subjectivism seemed a more rational scheme 
than pessimism. "When the healthy love of life is on one and all 
its forms and appetites seem so unutterably real, when the most 
brutal and the most spiritual things are lighted by the same 
sun and each is an integral part of the total richness - then 
it seems a grudging and sickly way of meeting so robust a 
universe," said James, "to shrink from any of its facts and wish 
them not to be. Rather take the strictly dramatic point of view 
and treat the v/hole thing as a great unending romance, which the 
spirit of the universe, striving to realise its own content, is 
eternally thinking out and representing to itself." While he saw 
these reasons in favor of subjectivism yet he say reasons against 
it which are stronger than these. 
In discussing subjectivism he said, 47. "Once dismiss the 
notion that certain duties are good in themselves and that we 
are here to do them, no matter how we feel about them; once 
consecrate the opposite notion, that our performances and our 
violations of duty are for a common purpose, the attainment of 
subjective knowledge and feeling,that the deepening of these is 
the tfhief end of our lives and at what point on the downward slope 
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are we to stop." 
"Everywhere subjectivism fostors the fatalistic mood of the 
mind. It makes those who are already inert, more pasiive still. 
It renders whollt reckless those, whose energy is already in 
excess. Its optimism turns to an ethical indifference in 
practical life, which infallibly brings dissolution in its 
train." 
The only escape from subjectivism is by the practical way, 
the philosophy of objective conduct. With the vision of certain 
work to be done, of certain outward changes to be wrogutht or 
resisted, our intellectual horizon terminates. "No matter how 
we feel, if we are faithful in the outward act and refuse to do 
wrong, the world will in so far be safe and we quit of our 
debt toward it. The essence of this philosophy is the 
willingness after bringing about some external good, to feel 
at peace - for our responsibility ends with the performance of 
that duty and the burden of the rest we may lay on higher powers." 
48. He believed that the indeterminist way is the only 
consistent way of a world whose parts may effect one another 
through their conduct being either good or bad. "There can be 
no interest, zest or excitement in achieving the right way 
unless we are enables to feel that thewrong way is also a 
possible and a natural way - nay more a mencaing and an 
46. Villi p. 170. 47. 711. PP. 171-175. 48. VII, pp. 175-6, 
-28-
imminent way - and what sense can there be in condemning ourselves 
for taking the wrong way unless the right way was open to us as 
well." He says further, "I cannot understand the willingness 
to act, no matter how we feel, without the belief that acts 
are really good or bad. I cannot understand the belief that an 
act is bad without regret at its happening. I cannot understand 
regret without the admission of real genuine possibilities in 
the world. Indeterrainism offends only the native absolutism 
of my intellect which perhaps deserves to be kept in check. 
Determinism violates my sense of morality through and through. 
If we think of some of the crimes of the universe as necessary 
expressions of the universe as a whole, we cannot but shrink from 
complicity with such a whole. The plainest pessimism so that it 
be straight-forward is a thousand times better than such system-
atic corruption of our moral sanity but far better than either 
is the world of chance. Chance means pluralism and nothing 
more. The world with a chance in it of being altogether good, 
even if the chance never come to pass, is better than a world 
with no such chance at all." 
Determinism has said, 'banish chance from the view of 
the future for it means the suicide of reason but James says 
49. "chance means that in moral respects, the future may be 
other and better than the past has been." This is the only 
'chance' we have any motive for suffering to exist. Its presence 
49. VII, pp, 176-183, 
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is the vital air which lets the world live, the salt which 
keeps it sweet. The admission of an unguaranteed chance or 
freedom does not preclude the notion of a providence governing 
the world, for the belief in freewill is not, in the least, 
incompatible with the belief in providence, provided we do not 
restrict providence to fulminating nothing but fatal decrees. 
If you allow him to provide possibilities as well as actualities 
to the universe and to carry on his own thinking in these two 
categories, chances may be there, uncontrolled even by him and 
the course of the universe be really ambiguous and yet the end 
of all things may be just what he intended it to be from all 
eternity. The creator himself would not need to know all the 
details of actuality until they came, and at any time, his own 
view of the world would be a view, partly of facts and partly 
of possibilities, exactly as ours is now. Of one thing, however, 
he might be certain and that is his world was safe and that no 
matter how much it might zigzag, he would surely bring it home 
at last. It makes no difference who decides the possibilities 
as long as we admit that the issue is decided nowhere else than 
here and now. Determlnists say it was all settled long ago." 
50. "The actually possible in this world is vastly narrower 
than all that is demanded and there is always a pinch between the 
ideal and the actual which can only be got through by leaving 
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part of the ideal behind. Since everything which is demanded 
is by that fact a good, must not the guiding principle for 
ethical philosophy be simply to satisfy at all times as many 
demands as we can, but there is nothing final in any actually 
given equilibrium of human ideals but the new conquer the old 
and the new will in turn be overthrown." In point of fact, 
there are no absolute evils and no non-moral goods, and the 
highest ethical life consists in the breaking of rules which 
have grown too narrow for the actual case, 50. "There is but 
one unconditional commandment which is that we should seek 
incessantly with fear and trembling so to vote and toact as to 
bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can 
aee." 
51. The trouble with many philosophies is that they seem 
to have nothing to do with the concrete things of human life. 
James wanted a philosophy that is loyal to scientific facts and 
is at the same time religious, with the old confidence in human 
values. He shows why he considers some of the systems inadequate. 
The superficiality of Leibintzs rationalistic system is shown 
when he tries to prove that although many more are condemned than 
are saved in the world, yet this is not an evil, because the 
universe, being so much greater than the world, the good in it 
overshadows the evil. The shallowness of rationalism may be 
50, VI. pp. 204-207. 51. IV. pp. 15 - 29. 
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shown today as well as In Leibritz's time. Practical men think 
perfection is still in the process of achievement, while to the 
rationalist the absolute ground of things is a perfection 
eternally complete. Royce and Bradley say that the evil in 
the world only shows more plainly God's presence. "These men 
are not dealing with realities. The thinking feeling mass are 
coming to judge the world for themselves. One fact of this 
world is a workman killing himself and family. All the treatises 
on God or love cannot destroy or make this fact less." Morrison 
Swift says, "God will not give religion twenty centuries more to 
prove itself. Its probation is ended." 
52. Professor James offers pragmatism as a philosophy that 
can satisfy both kinds of demands. "It can remain religious as 
the rationalist and at the same time preserve the richest 
intimacy with facts." "Pragmatism is a method of settling 
disputes which could not otherwise be settled. Disputes are 
continuous over 'the one and the many, over materialism and 
spiritual ism. All disputes are idle if the consequence makes no 
practical difference. In serious dispute, we should be able to 
show that some practical difference would result from the right. 
Many disputes collapse when subjected to the simple test of 
tracing a concrete consequence. There is no difference In abstract 
52. IV. pp. 22-40. 
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truth that does not express itself in concrete fact." "The whole 
function of philosophy ought to he to find out what definate 
difference it will make to us, at definate times in our lives 
if this world formula or that world formula he the true one." 
"The words God, Matter, Reason, Absolute, and Energy appear 
now not as a solution of the universe but as a program for 
more work, as an indication of the ways in which existing 
realities may be changed." Pragmatism sets all our theories 
to work. It agrees with nominalism in always agreeing with 
particulars, with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical 
aspects, with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, 
uselsss questions and metaphysical abstractions. "It is the 
attitude of looking away from first things, principles, cat-
egories, supposed necessities and looking toward last things, 
fruits, consequences and facts." 
Pragmatism has come to be used in a wider sense also, 
"meaning a theory of truth." "Inductive logic, a branch of 
philosophy, is the study of the conditions under Trtiich our 
sciences have evolved.When the first laws of mathematics, logic, 
and natural uniformities were discovered, men believed that 
they saw things so clearly that they were thinking "the eternal 
thoughts of the Almighty" but as sciences have developed, men 
53. IV. pp. 43-81. 
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have seen that the laws cannot he counted because of their 
number, that they are merely theories which may be of use. They 
are a man made language used to help one understand the reality 
within the universe." Sigwart and Ostwald and later Schiller 
and Dewey with other logicians say that 'truth, in our ideas 
and beliefs1, means the same as truth in scftnce , that is that id-
eas, which are themselves parts of experience, become true 
just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation 
with other parts of our experience, that is any idea which will 
be satisfactory link one part of our experience with another, 
thus simplifying and saving labor, is true for just so m&ch, true 
instrumentality. This view of truth taught at Chicago and 
Oxford, that truth in our ideas means their power to work, is 
called 'instrumental truth." This method of discovering truth 
is used by geologists, biologists and philologists. They take 
some simple process which they could observe in operation and then 
make it apply to all times and sum up its effect through the 
ages. Schiller and Dewey generalized the process of how any 
individual settles into new opinions. A man has a set of old 
beliefs. Another comes which disturbs the former. He feels 
he c annot give up the first and finds a new idea finally which 
he can graft on the first which will not very much disturb his 
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first ideas and so he runs one experience into another. "Hew 
truth is always a go between, a smoother over of transitions." 
"A theory satisfies us to the extent that it does not interfere 
with our preconceived idea of truth but the same theory does 
not satisfy all alike." "Truth gets itself classed as true by 
the way it works. Truth may simply add new facts to experience 
or it may cause the rearrangement of experience." It seemed 
that radium would change all our ideas of the conservation of 
energy but it was found that the old ideas of energy need only 
be extended." Truth is plastic and changes to fit the human 
need and it must do this and have a practical result if it is 
living truth." This is the scope of pragmatism, first a 
method and second a genetic theory of what is meant by truth. 
53. Rationalism has ridiculed Schiller's and Dewey's 
theory because the rationalist deals only with abstract truths 
while pragmatism deals with their utility, satisfacfcbriness and 
the way it works. Rationalism says it must be what we ought to 
think unconditionally but logic instead of psychology should 
govern our thinking. "Por the one truth, is an abstraction, for 
the other, a class name for ali sorts of definate working 
values in experience. The idea of a monarch working above 
things is hard for the empiracist to accept because it has no 
conception with concreteness. They accept rather a God working 
-27-
in things." The rationalist thinks that no matter what the 
facts of the world are, God is father of them. "The God of 
earth and heaven," James says, " is needed more in human trials 
than in any visionary life." Pragmatism has no materialistic 
bias as empiricism has. "She has no objections to abstract-
ness if it carries you somewhere. She has no apriori pre-
judices against theology. If they prove to have a value for 
concrete life, they will be true, how much more they are true 
must depend upon their relation to other acknowledged truths." 
In so far as the Absolute of transcendental idealism affords 
comfort to anybody, it performs concrete function and this far, 
according to pragmatism, it is true. By applying the prag-
matic method, we understand them to mean by comfort that they 
need have no responsibility because the world is in better hands 
than theirs and will go on all right. This is the way the 
pragmatist looks upon this belief in the Absolute. 
54. "Truth is one species of good and not a category 
distinct from good and co-ordinate with it. The true is the 
name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of 
belief and good too for definate assignable reasons, for If 
there were no good in true ideas, then only the false ones would 
be useful. It would be our duty to shun truth." Certain ideas 
are not only agreeable but helpful in practical life. What is 
better for us to believe is true unless the belief incidentally 
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clashes with some other vital benefit. "The greatest enemy 
of one of our truths may be the rest of our truths,? Truths 
want to preserve themselves. Pragmatism uns tiff ens our theories. 
She will entertain any hypothesis or consider any evidence. She 
widens the field of search for God. 
54. "Truth," said James, "is the agreement of ideas with 
reality. Pragmatists and intellectualists both accept this 
definition as a matter of course. They quarrel about the terms 
agreement and reality. If our ideas cannot copy definately 
their object, what does agreement with that object mean?" Some 
idealists think ideas are true when they are what God would 
have us think about an object, others think our ideas true just 
in proportion as they are copies of the Absolute's eternal way 
of thinking. The great assumption of the ltellectualists is that 
truth means a lifeless, motionless relation. When you get your 
true idea of anything, there's an end of the matter, you are in 
possession and know and there is nothing more to follow. Prag-
matism asks what concrete difference will an idea being true 
make in any one's actual life. "True ideas are those that we 
cSan assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. Palse ideas 
are those that we cannot. This is the meaning of truth." "The 
truth of an idea is not a stagnate property inherent in it. 
54. IV, pp. 202-212 
-29-
The idea ia made true by events. It must verify itself. It's 
validity is the process of its validation. Verification and 
validation mean that our ideas agree with reality." It is our 
duty to gain true thoughts because they are invaluable instru-
ments of action. "It is an advantage to have a general stock 
of extra truths of merely possible situations on hand. We 
store them away in our memory. When such an extra truth is 
needed in an emergency, it passes from cold storage to do work 
in the world and our Belief in it grows active. You can say 
of it then that it ia useful because it is true or true because 
it is useful." "True is the name for whatever idea starts the 
verification process, useful is the name for its completed 
function in experience." On the common sense level, the truth 
of a state of mind means this function of a leading towards 
other ideas which will be worth while. A man, who is lost sees 
a path and follows it, thinking there is a house at the other 
end. He verifies this idea when he finds the house. Some 
truths we verify and others we feel so certain that we can 
verify them that we do not try it. Our thoughts and beliefs 
pass as true as long aa nothing challenges them. They have 
been verified by somebody. Things exist in kind and not simply 
so when one is verified, we can in most cases be sure of the 
rest. 
54. There is a realm of mental relations where truth is 
to be considered as well as with facts. Truth here has an 
eternal character. Here also truth is an affair of leading. 
Our ideas must agree with realities, whether the realities are 
concrete or abstract, whether facts or principles. Realities 
mean either facte or abstract kinds of things and relations 
perceived intuitively between them. They must take account 
also of the truth already in possession. To copy a reality 
is one very important way of agreeing with it but it is far 
from being essential. The essential thing is the process of 
being guided. "Any idea that fits and adapts our life to the 
whole setting of reality will agree sufficiently to meet the 
requirements of truth." "We must talk consistently as well as 
think consistently for thuB truth is made available for every 
one." Agreement thus turnB out to be essentially an affair of 
leading that is useful because it is into quarters that contain 
important objects. All true processes must lead to the fact 
of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere, which 
somebody's ideas have copied. 
55. Truth, then according to Professor James, is simply a 
collective name for verification process, just as health, wealth, 
strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with 
55. IV, pp. 212-235. 
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llfe and aleo pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth 
is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made in the 
course of experience. The rationalist says, "Truth is not 
made. It has nothing to do with experience," but for James, 
the true ia only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just 
as the right la only the expedient in the way of our behaving. 
"Experience has ways of boiling over and making us correct our 
present formulas." The abaolutely true, meaning what no 
farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing 
point toward which we imagine that all our temporary truths 
will some day verge. "Truths emerge from facts but they dip 
forward into facta again and add to them which facts again 
create or reveal new truth and so on indefinately." The facts 
meanwhile are not true. They simply are. This is the differ-
ence between pragmatism and rationalism. The rationalist will 
not agree that either reality or truth can change. Truth claims 
abstractly to be recognized but it is only necessary to recognize 
concrete truth when it is expedient. 
56. James applies the pragmatic method to the question, 
"What ia matter? He saya, we find that it makes no difference 
whatever whether the world is run by matter or not, as far as 
the past of the world goes." The theist may show how a God 
made the world and a materialist may show how it resulted from 
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blind forces and if the world has no future development, then 
pragmatism cannot apply its test because according to either 
theory, all the consequences have been shown and are identical. 
"If the world was finished, God's work would be done and he, 
by his presence, could not make it any more living, that is if 
it is completed, calling God the author or matter the author 
could not make it any more or less." There is no use for a 
discussion between materialism and theism, i f there is no 
future detail of experience or conduct to be deduced from our 
hypothesis. The common man and the scientist have no use for 
this discussion unless the philosopher can show one of these 
to have a practical outcome. In this world in which we live 
that has a future, this question of materialism or theism is 
intensely practical. 
56. Spencer urges that we throw away these two opposing 
terms and use Vthe primal mystery" or "the unknowable energy" 
or "the one and only power," because 'if matter has accomplished 
this, it is what you mean by God. James says Spencer "is look-
ing only at the past and forgets the future of the world and 
the question "What does the world promise?" If by the laws of 
this matter it were bound to lead the world to success and per-
fection, all would accept it, but science has foretold the 
56. IV, pp. 85-107. 
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death tragedy of every cosraically evolved thing or system of 
things." Theeetwo, theism and materialism, are entirely 
different when taken in regard to the future instead of the 
past, for according to the laws of redistribution of matter and 
motion, they will undo their work again. Mr. Balfour shows the 
belief of science in his pictures of the end of the world when 
it is as a man had never lived. This final wreck and tragedy 
is the essence of scientific materialism. It is not, as 
Spencer holds, that we complain of materialism for its gross-
ness, but we complain of it because it is not a fulfiller of 
our remotest hopes or our more ideal interests. The notion of 
God, on the other hand, is superior in that it guarantees an 
Ideal order that ehall be permanently preserved. "No matter 
what may happen to a world, with a God in it, we believe he 
will, somewhere, bring the old ideals to fruition, so there 
can be no final tragedy. The deepest need of life is this ̂ need 
of an eternal moral order." This is the real difference between 
materialism and spiritualism. Materialism denies that the 
moral order is eternal while spiritualism affirms it. Some 
people say that the future of the world is not man's concern 
but the superior minds feel seriously on this subject. Spi-
ritualistic faith deals with a world of promise. Any religious 
view gives ue moral holidays. Theevidence for God lies primarily 
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in inner personal experience. The truth of God has to run the 
gauntlet of all our other truths. Our final opinion about 
God can only be settled after all the other truths have 
straightened themselves out together." 
57. God's existence has been considered for along time to 
have been proven by design in nature, the eyes and light being 
adapted to each other, etc. Darwin showed how chance happen-
ings fitted each other and he showed the waste in nature while 
the adaptation was taking place. "The aim of God is not 
merely to make men and save them but rather to get this done 
through the agency of natures vast maohinery." Bo matter what 
nature produces, the means must have been fitted to that pro-
duction. "The words design or designer can have no meaning 
to the pragmatiet except as a vague confidence in the future." 
58, The rationalist thinks of freewill as a virtue added 
to man whioh increases his dignity. Determinists diminish 
man by saying he transmits nothing to the future that is 
original. Free will has been discussed pragmatically and both 
freewillist and determinists have taken the ground of account-
ability and merit or demerit. The freewillist say, "if we 
merely transmitted the push of the whole past, how could we be 
praised or blamed for anything." The determinists say, "how 
can they be responsible for any act if it is simply tacked on 
57. IV, pp. 109-115. 58. IV, pp. 115-123. 
-35-
to them." "The trouble is that human ethics should not 
revolve about the question of merit," said James, "God alone 
can know our merits, if we have any." Free will pragmatically, 
means novelties in the world, "the right to expect that the 
future will not imitate and repeat the past." There is general 
uniformity of nature. Free will holds up improvement as at 
least possible. "If the past and present were entirely good, 
then we might wish the future to be no different. If the 
world were already perfect, freedom could only mean "to be 
worse.* Freewill has no meaning unless it be a doctrine of 
relief. The words, God, freewill, design have no other prac-
tical significance. Pragmatism alone can read a positive meaning 
into this. She turns her back upon the intellectualist point 
of view altogether. "Gods in his heaven, alls right with the 
world," that is the real heart of theology and needs no rational-
ist definition. Pragamatism thus ceases to look back upon 
principles and looks toward the future. The vital question for 
all is, "What is the world going to be?" Philosophy must 
deal with things of earth. These questions must be treated 
by minds less abstract and more scientific but not less 
religious. 
59. Therelation between abstract ideas and concrete 
realities, as pragmatism concerns it, may be shown by the 
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following illustration given by Professor James: "Look up 
through a tumbler of clear water with a light above it. The 
Water may represent the world of sensible facts, and the air 
above, the world of abstract ideas. Both worlds are real but 
the locus of all experience is the water. The abstract 
principles are necessary for life but their only function is 
directing. This shows how something, not sufficient for life, 
may yet determine life. Professor James thought the problem of 
the 'one and the many' the most important of all philosophical 
problems. He believed that he could tell the character of a 
man if he knew whether he is a monist of pluralist. 
60. Philosophy has manifested, above everything else, its 
interest in unity but the intellect needs not only unity but 
variety. "The aim of the intellect is neither unity nor variety 
by themselves, but totality." "The thought of the world being 
one, of its unity instead of its manyness is so prevalent, that 
it might becalled a part of the philosophical common sense." Both 
empiricists and rationalists say the world is one or it could 
not be a world. The empiricists, however, are still curious 
to know the special facts, while the rationalists think of an 
abstract mystical unity. 
60. The pragmatic method asks, "What is the practical 
value of the 'oneness' for us?" Thus we come from the vague 
to the concrete. Following are some of the ways in which the 
«*»vdS» pp. 1 2 7 - 1 2 9 6 0 . pp. 129-161. 
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oneness of the universe might make a difference. First, the 
world is at least one subject of discourse. "If there could 
he no union of its parts, we could not speak of the whale of 
it at once, hut by world or universe we mean the whale of it, 
but the chaos has just as much unity of discourse as a cosmos. 
Second, "Are the parts of the universe continuous?" Do the 
parts of the universe hang together instead of being like 
detached grains of sand ? Grains of sand hang together in the 
space in which they are embedded and if you can pass through 
this space, you can go from one to two. "Space and time are 
thus vehicles of continuity by which the world's parts hang 
together." The practical result to us from these forms of 
union is then, that our whole motar life is based upon them. 
In the third place, "lines of influence may be traced by which 
things hang together." This is true of the whole universe. 
"In the physical world, such uniting influences as gravity and 
heat" conduction, also electric luminous and chemical influ-
ences but here the first lines of influence are interrupted by 
inert or opaque bodies." Things are joined together by many 
kinds of systems. Men are joined by acquaintanceship. "You 
may carry a message any place in this system If you have a 
conductor but it will go wrong if you have a non-conductor." 
There are smaller systems within the larger. The world is 
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becoming unified in definate systematic ways through human 
efforts. The same part may figure in many different systems. 
Everything that exists is influenced in someway "by something 
else. "Any kind of influence helps to make the world one just 
so far as you can follow it from next to next." Prom this 
systematic point of view, the pragmatic value of the world's 
unity is that all these definate networks actually and 
practically exist. "If you have non-conductors instead of 
conductors, then the world is not one "but many. The oneness 
and the manynesa are absolutely co-ordinate here just as space 
separates things and unites them." 
60. The most important sort of union that obtains among 
things, pragmatically speaking, is their generic unity, that 
is things exist in kinds. If no two things were alike in the 
world, we could not argue from the past to the future. This 
generis unity is perhaps the most momentous pragmatic specifica-
tion of what it may mean to say 'the world is One.* We would 
have absolute generic unity if everything could be put in 
one class. The class 'Beings,' thinkables, experiences, would 
be candidates for this position. 
60. That the world is one may mean also its unity of 
purpose. "It is possible to conceive of ali the• many:/pur-• 
poses in the world being enveloped in one single purpose." 
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Appearances conflict with this view. Theologians, as they 
see the warring interests of the parts of the world grow more 
concrete, cannot imagine what the final purpose is like. "We 
can generalize all that the evil in the world means its greater 
perfection hut the veil is so great in the world that a God 
who can relish such horrors is not the God for human beings 
to appeal to, not the manlike God of the common people." 
60. Idealism says that the many exist only as objects for 
the thought of the one Knower. The Absolute has far reaching 
practical consequences but to James none of the proofs of 
such beings existence seem sound. The notion of the All-Knower 
is simply a hypothesis and is on the same par logically with 
the pluralistic notion. Professor Royce says that God's 
conscience in its wholeness forms one luminiously transparent 
conscious moment. Empiricism thinks that the greatest knower 
of all may not know all things at once, in one case knowledge 
would be unified, in the other strung along. "The great 
intellectual 1st achievement of our time is that the notion of the 
eternal or instantaneious knower has driven out the conception 
of substance, universal substance which alone has being in and 
from itself. To those who take it intellectually today, it 
always means the one Knower. This involves, they think, all 
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the rest which Christian science calls the 'One Life, 'One 
Truth,' 'One Love', 'One Principle', 'One Good and One God'." 
"The authority which absolute monism possesses over some per-
sons is mystical rather than intellectual." An example of 
this is the¥irvana state in Buddhism. You do not reason but 
after certain stages, you see and can report the truth. James 
says, "We all have this germ of mysticism in ourselves and 
many feel that logic or no logic, Absolute Oneness must 
somehow, at any cost, be true." Treating the problem in a 
purely intellectual way, pragmatism abjures absolute monism and 
absolute pluralism. 
James held that pragmatic principles can not reject 
any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it. 
Universal conceptions may be as real for pragmatism as part-
icular sensations are. They have no meaning or reality if 
they have no use. The only way to extract a term's meaning is 
to use the pragmatic method on it. When you say a thing is 
possible, it makes at least this difference, that if anyone 
calls it actual or impossible of necessary you can contradict 
him. When you say a thing is possible, it makes this negative 
difference, that there is nothing existing, which Is capable 
of preventing the possible thing. The absence of real grounds 
of interference may thus be said to make things not impossible, 
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therefore possible in the bare or abstract sense. Prag-
matically this means, not only that there are no preventative 
conditions present, but that some of the conditions of pro-
duction of the possible thing are actually present.' His 
belief in regard to future of the world may be seen from the 
following quotation: 61. "To say pragmatically that the sal-
vation of the world is possible means that some of the con-
ditions of the world's deliverance do actually exist." "The 
more of them that exist and the fewer preventing conditions 
you can find, the better grounded is this possibility of 
salvation and the more probably does the fact of the deliver-
ance become." "It would contradict the very spirit of life to 
say tjiat our minds must be indifferent and neutral in ques-
tions like that of the world's salvation." Pessimists think the 
salvation of the world impossible. Optimism thinks the world's 
salvation inevitable. Between these two stands meliorism 
which treats salvation as neither necessary or impossible. It 
treats it as a possibility which becomes more probable, the 
more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become. Prag-
matism must incline toward meliorism. 61. "Some conditions 
of the world's salvation are already existent. Every ideal 
realized will be one moment in the world's salvation. These 
ideals are not bare abstract possibilities. They are live 
61. IV, pp. 284-301. 
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possiblities "for", says Professor James, "we are their live 
champions and if the complimentary conditions come and add 
themselves, our ideals will become actual things. The com-
plimentary conditions are such a mixture of things as will in 
time give us a chance to act and then the acts themselves. 
Our acts are the parts of the world to which we are closest, 
the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate and com-
plete." Professor James asks, ""Why not take them then at 
their face value? Why may they not be the actual turning places 
and growing places of the world, which they seem to be, why 
not the workshop of being, where we catch fact in the making, 
so that nowhere may the world grow in any other kind of way 
than this ? Thus our acts create the world's salvation as 
far as it makes room for itself, so far as it leaps into the 
gap." "Of course it does not create the whole world's sal-
vation but just so much of this as itself covers of the world's 
extent." This is called irrational that single parts of 
the world should grow. James says there is no ultimate reason 
why anything should grow at all. 
The only real reason why anything should ever come is that 
someone wished it. It is demanded, perpahs demanded to give 
relief to only a small fraction of the world's mass. The only 
fully rational world would be the Absolute's own world where 
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every desire is fulfilled instantly without having to consider 
or placate surrounding or intermediate powers. He calls upon 
the phenomenal world to be and it is, exactly as he calls for 
it, no other conditions being required. In our world the 
wishes of the individual are only one condition. Other 
individuals are there with other wishes and they must be 
propitiated first but in regard to the worldgrowing piece-
meal by the contribution of its several parts, Professor 
James says, 61. "Take the hypothesis seriously and as a live 
one. Suppose that the world's author put the case to you 
before creation saying, 'I am going to make a world not certain 
to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be con-
ditional merely, the condition being that each several agent 
does his own 'level best". I offer you the chance of taking 
part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It 
is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. 
It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be 
done. Will you join the procession ? Will you trust your-
self and trust the other agents enough to face the risk?" 
James asks, 61. "Would you say that rather than be part 
and parcel of so fundamentally pluralistic and irrational a 
universe, you preferred to relapse into the slumber of non-
entity from which you had been momentarily aroused by the 
tempter's voice?" 
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61. If we are normally constituted, the world proposed 
would seem rational to us in the most living way. "Most of 
us would therefore welcome the proposition. It would he just 
like the world we practically live in." "There are moments 
of discouragement in us all when we mistrust the chance of 
things and would he absorbed into the Absolute or find the 
peace of Nirvana as the Hindoo and Buddhist who are afraid of 
more experience." 61. "In the salvation of the world, must 
all he saved? Is no price to be paid in the work of salvat-
ion? Doesn't the very seriousness that we attribute to life 
mean that losses form a part of it and that there are genuine 
sacrifices somewhere and that something permanently drastic and 
bitter always remains at the bottom of its cup?" 
Professor James says, 61. "I cannot speak officially as 
a pragmatist here: all I can say is that my own pragmatism 
offers no objection to my taking sides with this more moralistic 
view and giving up the claim of total reconciliation. The 
possibility of this is involved in the pragraatistic willingness 
to treat pluralism as a serious hypothesis. In the end it, is our 
faith and not our logic that decides such questions and I 
deny the right of any pretended logic to veto my own faith. I 
am willing that there should be real losers and real losers and 
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take part in scenes of whose significance, they have no 
inkling, hut just as many of the dogs and cats ideals coincide 
with our ideals, and the dogs and cats have daily living proof 
of the fact, so we may well believe, on the proofs that reli-
gious experience affords, "that higher powers exist and are 
at work to save the world on ideal lines similar to our own." 
The part of James' philosophy which has created the 
most widespread discussion has been his doctrine of pragmatism. 
It has roused antagonistic feelings. It has been misconstrued 
and misunderstood. James, in his volume on the meaning of 
Truth has said that most of the "pragmatist and anti-pragmatist 
warfare is over what the word 'truth' shall be held to sig-
nify and not over any of the facts embodied in truth situa-
tions: for both pragmatists and anti-pragmatiBts believe in 
existent objects, just as they believe in our idea of them." 
James thinks they have accepted each others ideas to the extent 
that there is nothing left to quarrel over. "When the pragmati-
sts speak of truth they mean exclusively something about the 
ideas, namely their workableness: whereas when anti-pragmatists 
speak of truth they seem most often to mean something about 
the objects. The pragmatist, if he agrees that an idea is 
'really' true also agrees to whatever it says about its object: 
and most anti-pragmatists have already come round to agreeing 
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no total preservation of all that is. I can -believe in the 
ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin and as an extract, not 
as a whole. When the cup is poured off, the dregs are left 
"behind forever, but the possibility of what is poured off is 
sweet enough to accept." 
The genuine pragmatist is 61. "Willing to live on a 
scheme of uncertified possibilities which he trusts, willing 
to pay with his own person, if need be, for the realization 
of the ideals which he frames." "He expects his fellowmen to 
co-operate with him in a universe of such a type, but he also 
looks to superhuman forces such as religious men of the plural-
istic type have always believed in." 
The Absolute has nothing but its superhumanness in 
common with the theistic God, On pragmatistic principles, if 
the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense 
of the word, it is true. "Whatever its residual difficulties 
may be, experience shows that it certainly does work and that 
the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will 
combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths." 
Professor James does not believe that human experience is 
the highest form of experience in the universe. "Rather, he 
says, "we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the 
universe as our domestic pets do to the whole of human life." They 
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that, if the object exists, the idea that it does so is 
workable." 
63. It seemed to Professor James that if he could success-
fully establish the pragnastic theory of truth it would be one 
important step in making another doctrine of philosophy 
prevail in which he was much interested. To this he gave the 
name of radical empiricism. Of this latter doctrine he has 
said, "Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next 
of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclu-
sion. The postulate is that the only things that shall be 
debatable among philosohpers shall be things definable in 
terms drawn from experience. The statement of fact is that 
the relations between things, conjunctive as well ad disjunc-
tive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, 
neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves. The 
generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience 
hold together from next to next by relations that are thems-elves 
parts of experiences. The directly apprehended universe needs, 
in short, no extraneous transrempirical connective support, 
but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous , 
structure." 
Of course rationalism and Absolute idealism both would 
62. Preface to XI, pp xi-xii. 63. Preface to XI,pp xii-xvlii. 
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seriously object to this radical empiricism of Professor 
James. These cannot be discussed any further here as the 
object of this thesis has been only to give a fair statement 
of James' own views. It is safe to say that the influence of 
"William James will never cease to have an important part in 
the great world of philosophical thought. 
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